This book explores the applicability of current US counterinsurgency doctrine in Joint Publication 3-24, Field Manual 3-24 and Field Manual 3-24.2 to the Lebanese Hizballah and Taliban insurgencies. In particular, this book examines the Cold War operational environment which influenced the writings of Mao Tse Tung, David Galula and Bard O'Neill and contrasts that to the current operational environment in which Lebanese Hizballah and the Taliban operate. Additionally, the book explores the historical evolution of Hizballah and the Taliban and the applicability of current US counterinsurgency doctrine to these two groups. In both case studies the applicability of current doctrine is mixed as doctrine downplays the role of religion and relies upon Maoist insurgency phasing to describe Hizballah and Taliban insurgency evolution. This is especially misleading with regard to how Hizballah converted itself into a major political party.The book concludes insurgency doctrine needs to be updated to reflect the current operational environment and recommends expanding the foreign area officer program, reexamining the Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan conflicts to guide counterinsurgency doctrinal development. By implementing these recommendations, senior US Army commanders will improve their ability to conduct Battle Command in counterinsurgency environments.